The Cons of Term Limits for Public Office 

Excerpted & adapted from a Brookings Institution Policy Paper (Five Reasons to Oppose Congressional Term Limits) by Casey Burgat, January 2018. More recent excerpts and adapting done by Andrea DiLorenzo, September 2024

1. Take power away from voters: Perhaps the most obvious consequence of establishing term limits is that it severely curtails the choices of voters. A fundamental principle in our system of government is that voters get to choose their representatives. Voter choices are restricted when a candidate is barred from being on the ballot.

2. Severely decrease policymaking capacity: Policymaking is a profession in and of itself. Our system tasks lawmakers with creating solutions to pressing societal problems, often with no simple answers and huge likelihoods for unintended consequences. Crafting legislative proposals or leading government offices is a learned skill; as in other professions, experience matters. The public is not best served if inexperienced members are making policy choices with widespread, lasting effects. Being on the job allows elected officials an opportunity to learn and navigate the labyrinth of rules, precedents and procedures unique to their office.

3. Limit incentives for gaining policy expertise: Office holders who know their tenure is limited face less pressure to develop expertise on specific issues simply because, in most cases, the knowledge accrued won’t be nearly as valuable in a few short years. Term limits would impose a tremendous brain drain. Having fewer experienced policymakers results in increased influence of special interests ready to fill the voids.

4. Automatically kick out effective lawmakers: No matter how knowledgeable or effectual an office holder may be, term limits would ensure that his or her talents will run up against a strict time horizon. In what other profession do we force the best employees into retirement with no consideration as to their abilities or effectiveness on the job? Doesn’t it make more sense to capitalize on their skills, talents and experience, rather than forcing them to the sidelines where they will do their constituents, the public and the institution far less good?

5. Do little to minimize corruptive behavior or slow the revolving door: Because term limits have never existed on the federal level, political scientists have studied states’ and foreign governments’ experiences with term limits to project what effects the measure would have on Congress. These studies regularly find that many of the corruptive, ‘swampy,’ influences advocates contend would be curtailed by instituting term limits are, in fact, exacerbated by their implementation.

Take lobbyist influence, for example. Term limit advocates contend lawmakers unconcerned with reelection will rebuff special interest pressures in favor of crafting and voting for legislation solely on its merits. However, the term limit literature commonly finds that more novice legislators will look to fill their own policy gaps by an increased reliance on special interests and lobbyists. Relatedly, lawmakers in states with term limits have been found, including from this 2006 50-state survey, to increase deference to agencies, bureaucrats, and executives within their respective states and countries because the longer-serving officials have more experience.

Establishing term limits would likely worsen the revolving door problem between Congress and the private sector by ensuring a predictably high number of former members available to peddle their influence. More lobbying firms could advance their special interests with former members making use of their relationships and deep understanding of the ways of the Hill.

On the surface, the case for term limits might seem strong due to its potential to curtail the forces of corruption. But, precisely because the creation of successful public policies by even the most experienced officials is so difficult and uncertain, we should not mandate that our most effective and seasoned politicians be forced out of an institution. Instead, as constituents, we should rely on the most effective mechanism available to remove unresponsive, ineffectual office holders: elections.